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BUT WHAT WILL IT COST?
THE HISTORY OF NASA COST ESTIMATING
by Joseph W. Hamaker
Within two years of being chartered in 1958
as an independent agency to conduct civilian
pursuits in aeronautics and space, NASA ab-
sorbed either wholly or partially the people,
facilities and equipment of several existing
organizations. These included the laborato-
ries of the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA) at Langley Research
Center in Virginia, Ames Research Center in
California, and Lewis Research Center in
Ohio; the Army Ballistic Missile Agency
(ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal Alabama, for
which the team of Wernher von Braun
worked; and the Department of Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
and their ongoing work on big boosters. 1
These were especially valuable resources to
jump start the new agency in light of the
shocking success of the Soviet space probe
Sputnik in the autumn of the previous year
and the corresponding pressure from an im-
patient American public to produce some re-
sponse. Along with these inheritances, there
came some existing systems engineering and
management practices, including project cost
estimating methodologies. This paper will
briefly trace the origins of those methods and
how they evolved within the agency over the
past three decades.
The Origins of the Art
World War II had caused a demand for mili-
tary aircraft in numbers and in models that
far exceeded anything the aircraft industry
had even imagined before. While there had
been some rudimentary work from time to
time 2 to develop parametric techniques for
predicting cost, there was certainly no wide-
spread use of any kind of cost estimating be-
yond a laborious build-up of work hours and
materials. A type of statistical estimating
had been suggested in 1936 by T. P. Wright
in the Journal of Aeronautical Science. 3
Wright provided equations which could be
used to predict the cost of airplanes over long
production runs, a theory which came to be
called the learning curve. By the time the de-
mand for airplanes had exploded in the early
years of World War II, industrial engineers
were happily using Wright's learning curve
to predict the unit cost of airplanes when
thousands were to be built (and its still used
today though the quantities involved are
more likely to be hundreds instead of thou-
sands).
In the late 1940s the Department of Defense
and especially the U.S. Air Force were study-
ing multiple scenarios of how the country
should proceed into the new age of jet air-
craft, missiles and rockets. The Air Force
saw a need for a stable, highly skilled cadre
of analysts to help with the evaluation of
these alternatives and established the Rand
Corporation in Santa Monica, California, as
a civilian think tank to which it could turn
for independent analysis. Rand's work repre-
sents some of the earliest and most systemat-
ic published studies of cost estimating in the
airplane industry.
Among the first assignments given to Rand
were studies of first and second generation
ICBMs, jet fighters and jet bombers. While
the learning curve was still very useful for
predicting the behavior of recurring cost,
there were still no techniques other than de-
tailed work-hour and material estimating for
projecting what the first unit cost might be (a
key input to the learning curve equation).
Worse still, no quick methods were available
for estimating the nonrecurring cost associ-
ated with research, development, testing and
evaluation (RDT&E). In the defense business
in the early to mid-1950s, RDT&E had sud-
denly become a much more important consid-
eration for two reasons. First, a shrinking de-
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fense budget (between World War II and the
Korean War) had cut the number of produc-
tion units of most Air Force programs. Sec-
ond, the cost of new technology had greatly
magnified the cost of development. The in-
ability to nimbly estimate RDT&E and first
unit production costs was a distinct problem.
Fortunately, within Rand a cost analysis de-
partment had been founded in 19504 under
David Novick, who was drafted into the job
because he was the only one around with any
cost experience. This group at Rand proved to
be prolific contributors to the art and science
of cost analysis so much so that the literature
of aerospace cost estimating of the 1950s and
1960s is dominated by the scores of Rand cost
studies that were published. 5 Novick and
others at Rand deserve credit for developing
and improving the most basic tool of the cost
estimating discipline, the cost estimating re-
lationship (CER), and merging the CER with
the learning curve to form the foundation of
aerospace estimating, which stands today.6
By 1951, Rand was devising CERs for air-
craft cost as a function of such variables as
speed, range, altitude, etc. Acceptable statis-
tical correlations were observed at least ac-
ceptable enough for the high-level compari-
sons between alternatives that Rand
was doing at the time. When the data was
segregated by aircraft types (e.g., fighters,
bombers, cargo aircraft), families of curves
were discovered. Since each curve corre-
sponded to different levels of complexity, the
stratification helped clarify the development
cost trends. Eventually, a usable set of pre-
dictive equations was derived that was
quickly put to use in Air Force future plan-
ning activities.
The use of the CERs and stratification were
basic breakthroughs in cost estimating, espe-
cially for RDT&E and first unit costs. For the
first time, cost analysts saw the promise of
being able to estimate relatively quickly and
accurately the cost of proposed new systems.
Rand extended the methods throughout the
1950s and by the early 1960s the techniques
were being acceptably applied to all phases of
aerospace systems. 7
The Early NASA Years
In the spring of 1957 the Army BallisticMis-
sile Arsenal (ABMA) in Huntsville, under
the direction of Wernher von Braun, initiat-
ed design studies on a large and advanced
rocket booster that could be used for large
DoD payloads then being conceptualized, s
Numerous design options were under consid-
eration and all of the most promising needed
cost projections.Von Braun's team had long
been flying experimental rockets, but pre-
cious littlecost data existed, and none exist-
ed for the scale of the rockets that were com-
ing off the drawing boards. Neverthe-
less,estimates were being demanded. With
the procedures that Rand had used on air-
craft,data was pieced together and plotted
against gross liftoffweight because this per-
formance variable was known both for the
historicaldata points and forthe concepts be-
ing estimated. The resulting CERs were at
the total rocket level (engines being added
separately based mainly on contractor esti-
mates) and often did not inspire much confi-
dence either by their correlation or their
number ofdata points.9
Suddenly, in the fall of 1957 the Soviets
launched Sputnik I and then, four weeks
later, Sputnik II (carrying a dog), and the
Army's big booster work took on an entirely
new importance. While vehicle configuration
studies inspired by the Soviet success contin-
ued at a rapid pace through 1958 and 1959,
some momentous programmatic decisions
were made regarding the ultimate manage-
ment relationships between ABMA, the
Army Redstone Project Arsenal (ARPA) and
NASA. ABMA and yon Braun, under ARPA
sponsorship, were designing a massive rock-
et called Saturn. The DoD, however, as
ARPA's parent organization, was coming to
the conclusion that they did not need such a
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super booster and was beginning to with-
draw support over the objections of both
ARPA and ABMA. In the end, by autumn of
1959, both the Secretary of Defense and
President Eisenhower had concluded that
ABMA and the Saturn should be transferred
to NASA. 1° In addition, a new home was
found for the von Braun team by setting
aside a complex within the borders of Red-
stone Arsenal in Huntsville.
By early fall of 1960, the Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) was operational.
NASA's first 10-year plan had been submit-
ted to Congress in February 1960; it called
for a broad program of Earth orbital satel-
lites, lunar and planetary probes, larger
launch vehicles and manned flights to Earth
orbit and around the moon. The cost, esti-
mated by analogies, intuition and guesses,
was given as $1 billion to $1.5 billion per
year. 11
With the Kennedy Administration in office
by early 1961, planning for a manned lunar
landing project continued. President Kenne-
dy and Vice President Johnson were both in-
terested in options for moving ahead of the
Soviets, and NASA was working on plans
that could place an American on the lunar
surface shortly after the turn of the decade.
The orbiting of Yuri Gagarin in April 1961
caused immediate questions from the Ad-
ministration and Congress about the costs of
accelerating the plans. Jim Webb, the NASA
Administrator, had been briefed on $10 bil-
lion cost estimates associated with the moon
project. Prudently, he decided to give himself
some rope and gave Congress a $20 to $40
billion range. (The program was to cost about
$20 billion ultimately.)
Despite the magnitude of the cost projec-
tions, in his State of the Union address in
May 1961, President Kennedy established
his famous goal of a lunar mission before the
end of the decade. NASA was off and run-
ning. MSFC took responsibility for the Sat-
urn launch vehicles, and the new Manned
Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston, created
in mid-1962 but operating before that out of
Langley, was given responsibility for the
payloadmin this case the modules that would
take the astronauts to the moon's surface and
back.
While MSFC was being organized, the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in California,
in business as an Army research organiza-
tion since the 1930s, was transferred to
NASA from the Army. JPL had already built
the Explorer satellite that had ridden an
ABMA rocket into orbit as the country's first
successful response to Sputnik. JPL began its
association with NASA by being assigned
the lead center role for Agency planetary
projects. As JPL began designing several
planetary probes, including the Ranger se-
ries of lunar spacecraft, the planetary series
of Mariner spacecraft and the Lunar Survey-
or spacecraft, they were dependent primarily
upon contractor quotes for purchased hard-
ware and their own work-hour and material
estimates for inhouse work.
As the pace of planning picked up, they be-
gan to use an Air Force tool, the Space Plan-
ner's Guide, 12a chapter of which is devoted to
weight-based CERs for space project estimat-
ing. In 1967, Bill Ruhland, a former Chrysler
Saturn I-C manager, went to work at JPL
and contracted with a new company called
Planning Research Corporation (which had
been started by some former analysts who
had worked on the Space Planner's Guide) to
improve the CERs. L3Ruhland stuck with es-
timating, and went on to become NASA's
preeminent estimator for planetary space-
craft throughout the 1970s and 1980s. PRC
leveraged its early relationship with JPL
and Ruhland by establishing cost modeling
contracts with most of the other NASA cen-
ters and dominating the development of
NASA cost models for the next 25 years.
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In March 1961, with launch vehicles, man-
ned capsules and planetary spacecraft work
underway, NASA dedicated the Goddard
Space Flight Center (GSFC) as another de-
velopment center. GSFC was assigned re-
sponsibility for Earth orbital science satel-
lites and soon had on the drawing board a
number of spacecraft for which cost esti-
mates were needed. The Orbiting Astronomi-
cal Observatory, the Orbiting Geophysical
Observatory and the Nimbus programs were
all started early in the 1959-60 period and,
like most other projects in the Agency at the
time, experienced significant cost growth.
GSFC organized a cost group to improve the
estimates, first under Bill Mecca, and later
managed by Paul Villone. In 1967 Werner
Gruhl joined the office where he implement-
ed numerous improvements to the GSFC
methods. In later years he joined the Comp-
troller's office at NASA Headquarters as
NASA's chief estimator.
Among the improvements creditable to
GSFC during the late 1960s and early 1970s
were: 1) spacecraft cost models that were sen-
sitive to the number of complete and partial
test units and the quality of the test units; 2)
models devoted to estimating spacecraft in-
struments; and 3) the expansion of the data-
base through the practice of contracting with
the prime contractor to document the cost in
accordance with NASA standard parametric
work breakdown structures (WBS) and ap-
proaches: 4
By 1965 most of NASA's contractors were re-
vising their traditional approach to cost esti-
mating, which had relied upon the design en-
gineers to estimate costs, replacing it with an
approach that created a new job position that
of trained parametric cost estimators whose
job it was to obtain data from the design en-
gineers and translate this information into
cost estimates using established proce-
dures: s At essentially the same time, cost es-
timating was being elevated to a separate
discipline within NASA Headquarters and at
the NASA field Centers. This trend toward
cost estimating as a specialization was
caused by several factors. First, it was unre-
alistic to expect that the design engineers
had the interest, skills and resources neces-
sary to put together good cost estimates. Sec-
ond, during the preceding three years, the
pace of the Gemini and Apollo programs had
so accelerated that the Requests for Propos-
als issued by the government typically gave
the contractors only 30 days to respond---only
parametricians had any hope of preparing a
response in this short amount of time. Third,
because of growing cost overrun problems,
NASA cost reviews had increased notably
and the reviewers were looking for costs with
some basis in historical actuals---essentially
a prescription for parametric cost estimating.
At both MSC and MSFC, the cost estimating
function was placed in an advanced mission
planning organization. At MSC, it was em-
bodied within Max Faget's Engineering and
Development Directorate, L_ and at MSFC it
was within the Future Projects Office headed
by Herman Koelle. 17 Faget, an incredibly
gifted engineer, had already left his imprint
on the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo pro-
grams, and was a strong believer in an ad-
vanced planning function with strong cost
analysis. Koelle, a German engineer who,
though not a member of the original team,
had later joined yon Braun, was also ex-
tremely competent and very interested in
cost. Koelle had, in fact, along with his depu-
ty William G. Huber, assembled the very
first NASA cost methodology in 1960, pub-
lished first in an inhouse report TMand then in
1961 as a handbook that Koelle edited for
budding space engineers. 19
Out of the eye of the Apollo hurricane for the
moment, both the MSFC and the MSC cost
personnel now sought to regroup and at-
tempt to make improvements in capability.
In 1964 MSFC contracted with Lockheed and
General Dynamics 2° to develop a more rigor-
ous and sophisticated cost modeling capabil-
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ityfor launch vehicle lifecyclecostmodeling.
This effort was led by Terry Sharpe of
MSFC's Future Projects Office.Sharpe, an
Operations Research specialistinterested in
improving the rigor of the estimating pro-
cess,led the MSFC estimating group as they
managed the contractors'development of the
model and then brought it inhouse and in-
stallediton MSFC mainframe computers.
Through about 1965 the only computational
support in use by NASA estimators was the
Freidan mechanical calculator. By the mid-
1960s mainframe time was generally avail-
able, and by the late 1960s the miracle of
hand-held, four-function electronic calcula-
tors could be had for $400 apiece--one per of-
fice was the general rule. Throughout the
early 1970s the hand-held calculator ruled
supreme. By the middle 1970s, IMSAI 8080
8-bit microcomputers made their appear-
ance. Finally, by the late 1970s the age of the
personal computer had dawned. Estimators,
probably more than any other breed, imme-
diately saw the genius of the Apple II, the
IBM PC and the amazing spreadsheets: Visi-
calc, Supercalc and Lotus 1-2-3. Civilization
had begun.
The resulting capability was extremely am-
bitious for the time, taking into account a
multitude of variables affecting launch vehi-
cle life cycle cost. The model received signifi-
cant notoriety, and once the CIA inquired if
the MSFC estimators might make a series of
runs on a set of Soviet launch vehicles. Busy
with their own work, the estimators de-
murred. The CIA pressed the case to a higher
level manager, a retired Air Force colonel.
Suddenly the MSFC estimators discovered
that they had been mistaken about priori-
ties. The runs were made and the CIA ana-
lysts went away happy.
Later in 1964 after a reorganization, man-
agement of the MSFC cost office was taken
over by Bill Rutledge who went on to lead the
MSFC cost group for more than 20 years.
Rutledge steadily built the MSFC cost
group's strength until it was generally recog-
nized in the late 1960s as the strongest cost
organization within the Agency. One of Rut-
ledge's more outstanding innovations was
the acquisition of a contractor to expand and
maintain an Agencywide cost database and
develop new models. The REDSTAR (Re-
source Data Storage and Retrieval) database
was begun in 1971 and is still operational to-
day, supporting Agencywide cost activities.
The contract was originally awarded to PRC
and, under Rutledge's management, devel-
oped numerous models throughout the 1970s
and 1980s.
MSFC also established a grassroots cost esti-
mating organization within the MSFC Sci-
ence and Engineering laboratories. This
group was managed by Rod Stewart for a
number of years. After his retirement from
NASA, Stewart, along with his wife Annie,
authored an outstanding series of cost esti-
mating books. 21 In 1966, MSC, working in
parallel to the MSFC activities, contracted
with General Dynamics _2 and Rand 23 to im-
prove their spacecraft estimating capability.
The MSC cost group also significantly im-
proved their capabilities during this period
under the able management of Humboldt
Mandell, who was later to play a leading role
in the Shuttle, Space Station and Space Ex-
ploration Initiative cost estimating activi-
ties.
By 1967 both the MSC and MSFC cost esti-
mating organizations were beginning to ob-
tain the first historical data from the flight
hardware of the Apollo program. This includ-
ed cost data on the Saturn IB and Saturn V
launch vehicles by stage, and on the Com-
mand and Service Module (CSM) and the Lu-
nar Excursion Module (LEM) at the major
subsystem level. Fairly shallow data by to-
day's standards, it was considered somewhat
of a windfall to the NASA estimators who
had been struggling along with two- and
three-data point CERs at the total system
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level. The Project Offices at MSC and MSFC
compiled the data between 1967 and 1969
and documented the results in the unpub-
lished Apollo Cost Study (preserved today in
the JSC and MSFC cost group databases).
Eventually this was supplemented by paying
the CSM prime contractor to retroactively
compile the data in a WBS format useful for
parametric cost estimating. 24 Despite these
improvements, one Rand report in 1967 la-
ments that the number of data points for cost
estimating was depressingly low... "only one
subsystem contains more than four data
points and this paucity of data precludes the
application of statistical techniques either in
the development of the CERs themselves, or
in the establishment of confidence levels for
the predictive values generated by the
CERs."25
While most of the science programs were
managed out of JPL and GSFC, the research
centers (Ames, Langley, and Lewis) were
also given development projects from time to
time. Ames managed the Pioneer planetary
probes, Langley managed the Lunar Orbiter
and the Viking Mars mission, and LeRC
managed the Centaur project. Generally, the
costs were estimated using models from the
other Centers.
The Shuttle Era: Promise of Low Cost
By 1968 the nation was immersed in social
and political turmoil, the Vietnam War and
the attempt to build the Great Society.
Though the accomplishment of the first man-
ned lunar landing was not to occur until the
following year, the budget that NASA re-
ceived was lower than the previous year and
broke the trend of ever increasing flows of
money that the Agency had enjoyed since its
creation a decade before. NASA realized that
the dream of building directly on the expend-
able Saturn launch vehicle technology,
building Earth orbital and lunar orbital
space stations, continuing exploration of the
lunar surface and mounting an expedition to
Mars were not in the immediate plans.
By early 1969, while the ongoing Apollo pro-
gram prepared for the Apollo 11 mission to
the moon on which humans would land for
the first time, future planning activities
within NASA had been scaled back from the
overly ambitious, broad set ofspace activities
to focus on the crucial next step. Space sta-
tions, moon bases and Mars missions all
needed low-cost,routine transportation from
the Earth's surface to low Earth orbit.Ifthe
budget realitiesprecluded doing everything
at once, then the next thrust would be in low
Earth orbit transportation as a firstbuilding
block toallthe rest.
A task force was assigned in March 1969 to
study the problem and recommend options
for further study. 26 This report called for the
development of a new space shuttle system
that could meet certain performance and
cost-per-flight objectives. Many options were
examined, but the fully reusable two-stage
was the preferred choice because it seemed to
offer the lowest recurring cost. Concurrently
with these inhouse assessments, four paral-
lel Phase A (i.e., conceptual design) studies
had been awarded to General Dynamics,
Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas and North
American (today's Rockwell International).
For most of 1969 these studies proceeded
apace, churning out massive stacks of paper
designs, along with cost numbers that gave
the impression that all was well. For around
$10 billion in development costs, the most re-
usable Shuttle configurations offered recur-
ring costs of only a few million dollars per
flight.
As the Phase A studies neared completion in
late 1969, however, two cost-related prob-
lems began to emerge. First, NASA's com-
munications with the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) revealed that the outlook
for the NASA budget was not good. The pro-
jections showed that continued reductions in
NASA's funding were inevitable; the lower
budget numbers did not match the amount
needed to fund the favored Shuttle designs.
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Second, as NASA reviewed the contractors
cost estimates for the Shuttle and compared
the numbers to their own estimates, it be-
came clear that no one in the industry or the
government had a good handle on what the
Shuttle could be expected to cost.27
The problem with the estimates was analo-
gous data. A winged, reusable spaceship had
never been built before and all the cost esti-
mates were being based on extrapolations
from large aircraft such as the C-5, B-52,
B-70 (forwings, fuselage, landing gear, etc.),
from the Saturn (fortanks, thrust structure,
etc.)and from the Apollo capsules (forcrew
systems). The problem was compounded by
the scope of the estimating job. All the var-
ious designs being contemplated overloaded
the estimating resources that NASA had at
the time. The entire complement of NASA
estimators at the two lead Centers (JSC and
MSFC) numbered only eight people, yet cost
was to be one ofthe most key variables in the
decision making process concerning the
Shuttle. 2s
Because the magnitude of the upfront costs of
the fully reusable systems had not yet been
adequately estimated, NASA proceeded into
Phase B in mid-1970 with the intent of put-
ting more meat on the bones of the skeletal
designs. Meanwhile, negotiations with the
Office of Management and Budget continued
concerning the budget outlook, and the num-
bers got lower and lower. Slowly, the cost es-
timates became more realistic just as the
Phase B studies were nearing completion in
the summer of 1971.
The studies were extended so that cost cut-
ting measures could be investigated. First,
expendable drop tanks were substituted for
reusable interior tanks. Then the flyback
booster was scrapped, first for expendable
liquid rocket boosters, then for expendable
solid rocket boosters. Taken together, these
reductions made it possible to barely fit the
Shuttle's development within the OMB
guidelines, but each change had added to the
recurring cost per flight. 29
But the Shuttle peak year funding versus the
OMB budget cap was not the only cost ques-
tion dogging the Shuttle. For the mandated
Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs, mon-
ey had flowed without any requirement for
the Agency to show economic justification for
the projects. When the idea of a Shuttle sys-
tem was floated in 1969 as part of NASA's
plans after Apollo, the OMB decided that
such an expensive undertaking ought to
show some economic benefits that out-
weighed the costs. Because the analytical
skills for an economic justification did not ex-
ist inhouse and NASA thought it wise to
have independent support for the Shuttle,
the Agency hired the Aerospace Corporation,
Lockheed and economist Oskar Morgenstern
and his company Mathematica to develop the
data OMB wanted to see. Morgenstern
turned the economic analysis over to a young
protege named Klaus Heiss. Heiss put to-
gether an impressive study 3° that compared
the life cycle costs of the Shuttle with the
costs of the equally capable expendable
launch vehicles.
One of the more important arguments for the
Shuttle case was that payloads on the Shut-
tle would cost considerably less than pay-
loads on expendables, a notion that was
based on an extensive cost estimating study
done for NASA by Lockheed. 31 This study, a
classic for its scope, originality and method-
ology, nevertheless reached an exactly wrong
conclusion.
It is known now that Shuttle payloads actu-
ally cost more than those that fly on expend-
able launch vehicles due to the strenuous
safety review process for a manned vehicle.
But Lockheed forecasted that the payload de-
velopers would save about 40 percent of their
costs from the advantages offered by the
Shuttle. The advantages were thought to be
that: 1) the relatively high weight lifting per-
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formance and payload bay volume offeredby
the Shuttle would allow payloads to ease up
on lightweighting and miniaturization,
which are cost drivers;2) the Shuttle would
allow retrieval and refurbishment of satel-
litesinstead of buying additional copies as
was necessary with expendable rockets; and
3) a single national launch system such as
the Shuttle would allow standardization of
payloads instead of multiple designs config-
ured for the plethora of expendable vehicle
interfaces.Finally, itwas Aerospace's job to
determine the payload requirements and
produce trafficmodels, and they ultimately
forecasted the need for 60 Shuttle flightsper
year.32 While the Shuttle payload benefits
and flight rates were both flawed assump-
tions,Klaus Heiss constructed a discounted
costbenefit analysis that asserted savings in
the billions. At the least, the Aerospace,
Lockheed, Mathematica work sent the OMB
accountants to murmuring.
President Nixon finally gave the nod, and
the Shuttle's detailed design began in the
summer of 1972 under contract to the win-
ning prime contractor, North American--
though this did not end the debate over the
worthiness of the project.33All throug h 1973
NASA was very involved in extensive cap-
ture/costanalyses to produce data to answer
Congressional, GAO and OMB inquiries
about the Shuttle'seconomic forecasts.These
analyses were NASA inhouse extensions of
the work done by Mathematica, Lockheed
and Aerospace. The studies consumed most
of the resources of the MSFC and JSC cost
groups as well as Headquarters program of-
ricepersonnel. They compared the discount-
ed lifecycle costsof capturing the NASA and
DoD payloads with the Shuttle versus ex-
pendable launch vehicles. The Shuttle case
was finallydetermined to yield a 14 percent
internal rate of return and $14 billion of
benefits(in 1972 dollars).This data was used
as the final reinforcement of the Shuttle pro-
gram commitment.
Declining Budgets, Rising Costs
Once Shuttle development was safely under-
way by 1974, most of the estimating talent of
the Agency was turned to various kinds of
scientific satellite estimating. As NASA's
budget declined in the 1970s, both JPL and
GSFC pioneered such economies as the use of
the protoflight concept in spacecraft develop-
ment. Before the 1970s NASA had proto-
typed most spacecraft (i.e., built one or more
prototypes which served as ground test arti-
cles) before building the flight article. In the
protoflight approach, only one complete
spacecraft is built, which serves first as the
ground test article and is then refurbished as
the flight article. The protoflight approach
theoretically saves money. However, these
savings must be balanced against the cost of
refurbishing the test article into a state
ready for flight, the cost of maintaining more
rigid configuration control of the ground test
article to insure its eventual flight worthi-
ness, and the increased risk of having less
hardware.
Other attempts were made to lower cost
without much success. Low estimates based
on wishful thinking concerning off-the-shelf
hardware and reduced complexity proved un-
realistic,and overruns began to breed more
overruns as projects underway ate up the
funds other projectshad expected.
Meanwhile, as NASA Headquarters contin-
ued to guide the overall programs, handle
the politicalinterfaces,foster other external
relations, and integrate and defend the
Agency budget, a need was seen to strength-
en the Washington cost analysis function.34
Having moved to the Headquarters Comp-
troller'sOffice from GSFC in 1970, Werner
Gruhl set up an independent review capabil-
ity under Mal Peterson, an assistant to the
Comptroller. Gruhl aggressively championed
the constant improvement of the database.
Gruhl and Peterson's greatest contribution
was probably their relentlessurging for real-
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istic estimates. They also initiated an annual
symposium for all NASA estimators and
were instrumental in helping to establish a
process for Non-Advocate Reviews (NARs)
for potential new projects.
The NAR was instituted as a required miles-
tone in which each major new project had to
prove its maturity to an impartial panel of
technical, management and cost experts be-
fore going forward. As part of the NAR pro-
cess, Peterson and Gruhl, working with a rel-
atively small staff of one to three analysts,
undertook to perform independent estimates
of most of the major new candidates for au-
thorization. Peterson largely devoted himself
to penetrating reviews of the technical and
programmatic readiness, the underpinning
of the cost estimate. Gruhl, using mostly
models of his own developed from the RED-
STAR database, generated his own esti-
mates. Together they were a formidable
team and undoubtedly reduced the cost over-
run problem from what it would have been
without the NAR.
Another significant milestone in cost esti-
mating that occurred during the 1970s was
the emergence of the Price Model. First de-
veloped within RCA by Frank Freiman, the
model began to be marketed in 1975 by RCA
as a commercially available model. Frei-
man's brainchild was arguably the single
most innovative occurrence in parametric
cost estimating ever. His genius was to see
hardware development and production costs
as a process governed by logical interrela-
tionships between a handful of key variables.
Probably feeling his way with intuition and
engineering experience more than hard data,
Freiman derived a set of algorithms that
modeled these relationships. The resulting
model could then be calibrated to a particu-
lar organization's historical track record by
essentially running the model backward to
discover what settings for the variables gave
the known cost. Once calibrated, the model
could be run forward using a rich set of tech-
nical and programmatic factors to predict the
cost of future projects. While the Price
models are applicable to a wide range of in-
dustries in addition to aerospace, the model
first found use in the aerospace industry.
NASA encouraged Freiman to market his in-
vention, and actually provided him with data
for calibrating the model after observing its
potential in Shuttle cost estimating. 35 The
success of the Price model inspired the devel-
opment of several other commercial cost
models with application to hardware, soft-
ware and the life cycle.
By the late 1970s and into the mid-1980s, the
cost of NASA projects was a serious problem.
It was now obvious that Shuttle payloads
cost more, not less, than payloads on un-
manned vehicles. Overruns were worse than
ever despite better databases, better models,
better estimators, and more stringent Head-
quarters reviews. It seemed that NASA was
in danger of pricing itself right out of busi-
ness. 36 At JSC, Hum Mandell, assisted by
Richard Whitlock and Kelley Cyr, initiated
analyses of this problem. Making imagina-
tive use of the Price model, 37 they found that
NASA's culture drives cost and that the com-
plexity of NASA projects had been steadily
increasing, an idea also advanced by Gruhl.
Mandell argued persuasively to NASA man-
agement for a change in culture from the ex-
otically expensive to the affordable. At the
same time, he argued that estimates of fu-
ture projects needed to account for the stead-
ily increasing complexity of NASA projects.
Recent Years
Once the Space Shuttle had begun oper-
ations, NASA turned its attention once again
to defining a Space Station. After Pre-Phase
A and Phase A studies had analyzed several
configurations, in 1983 NASA ran a Wash-
ington-based, multi-center team called the
Configuration Development Group (CDG) to
lead the Phase B studies. The CDG was led
by Luther Powell, an experienced MSFC pro-
ject manager. For his chief estimator, Powell
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chose O'Keefe Sullivan, a senior estimator
from the MSFC cost group. Sullivan had just
completed managing the development of the
PRC Space Station Cost Model, _ an innova-
tive model that created a Space Station WBS
by cleverly combining historicaldata points
from parts of the Shuttle Orbiter, Apollo
modules, unmanned spacecraft and other
projects. This model was distributed and
used by allfour of the Work Package Centers
and was probably the most satisfactorypara-
metric cost model ever developed by NASA.
Work Package 1 (WP-1) was at MSFC, with
responsibilityfor the Station modules; WP-2
was at JSC with responsibility for truss
structures, RCS and C&DH; WP-3 was at
LeRC with responsibility for power; and
WP-4 was at GSFC with responsibility for
platforms. Sullivan used the model to esti-
mate the project at between $11.8 and $14
billion(in 1984 dollars).The content of this
estimate included the initial capability,
eight-person, 75-kilowatt station and space
platforms at two different orbital locations,
with additional dollarsrequired latertogrow
the program to fullcapability.39
Meanwhile, NASA Administrator Jim Beggs
had been negotiating with the OMB for sup-
port to start the project.Under pressure to
propose something affordable, Beggs com-
mitted to Congress in September 1983 that a
Station could be constructed for $8 billion,a
rather random number in light ofthe known
estimates and the fact that the conceptual
design had never settled down to an extent
necessary for a solid definitionand cost esti-
mate. Nevertheless, the Agency pushed
ahead with the Phase B studies and by fall
1987, needing to narrow the options in con-
figurations stillbeing debated between the
Centers, established a group called the Criti-
cal Evaluation Task Force (CETF), quar-
tered at LaRC and led by LaRC manager Ray
Hook. Hook brought Bill Rutledge in from
MSFC to lead the cost analysis effort,and
Rutledge assembled a team made up of esti-
mators representing the Work Package Cen-
ters and Headquarters (Bill Hicks, Richard
Whitlock, Tom LaCroix, and Dave Bates).
Over a period of a few intense weeks, they
generated the cost of the new baseline,
which, even after significant requirements
had been cut,stilltotaledat least$14 billion.
NASA reluctantly took this cost to the OMB.
Seeking to inspire a can-do attitude among
the CETF team, NASA management passed
out buttons containing the slogan We Can Do
It! One senior estimator, who had seen it all
before, modified his button to read We Can
Do It For $20 Billion! 40 Amid great political
turmoil, the Space Station was finally given
a go-ahead. Despite contractor proposed costs
that were more unrealistically optimistic
than usual, the source evaluations were com-
pleted and contracts were awarded for the
four work packages. The project managed to
survive several close calls in the FY1988
through FY1991 budgets, though with stead-
ily escalating costs and several iterations of
requirements cutbacks and redesigns. Like
the purchase of a car, the sticker price in-
cludes nonrecurring cost only, and this is the
cost NASA had always quoted Congress for
new projects, including the Space Station.
During the long and winding road of gaining
Congressional authority for the Station,
NASA was asked to include other costs such
as Station growth, Shuttle launch costs, op-
erations costs, and various other costs, which
led to confusion and charges of even more
cost growth than actually occurred.
As thisisbeing written, NASA isactively de-
signing and estimating the cost of several
major future programs including the Earth
Observation System, the National Launch
System and the Space Exploration Initiative,
among others. Each of these programs, like
most NASA programs before them, is unique
unto itselfand presents a new set of cost esti-
mating challenges. At the same time, the re-
cent years ofgrowth in budget resources that
NASA has enjoyed seems to have run its
course. In an era of relatively level budget
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authority, NASA is seeking ways to maxi-
mize the amount of program obtainable. New
ideas on this topic abound. Total Quality
Management, Design to Cost, Concurrent
Engineering and a number of other cultural
changes are being suggested as a solution to
the problems of high cost. As usual, the
NASA estimating community is in the mid-
dle. Armed with data from the past, which
somehow must be adapted to estimate the fu-
ture, they attempt to answer the all impor-
tant question: But what will it cost?
So brief a treatment of the history of NASA
cost estimating leaves so much unsaid that
apologies are in order. Nothing was men-
tioned of the aeronautical side of NASA, yet
they estimate the cost of projects that are no
less important to the nation than the space
projects focused upon here. The Kennedy
Space Center facilities and operations cost-
ing was not mentioned, though nothing
NASA has sent to space could have been sent
without them. Whole projects from which
much was learned about cost estimating (Vi-
king, Skylab, Spacelab, Centaur-G, Hubble
Space Telescope, Galileo, Magellan, Ulysses
and many others) had to be left unexplored.
Even when touched upon, many subjects
were given only the barest of treatments, the
expansion left for other studies.
Finally, while this paper unfairly singles out
a dozen or so individuals, another few score
men and women who have labored hard in
the crucial and controversial business of
NASA cost estimating will not see their
names here. They are saluted anyway.
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IMPROVING COST EFFICIENCY IN LARGE PROGRAMS
by John D. Hodge
This paper examines the question of cost,
from the birth ofa program to itsconclusion,
particularly from the point of view of large
multi-center programs, and suggests how to
avoid some of the traps and pitfalls.Empha-
sisisgiven tocost in the systems engineering
process, but there is an inevitable overlap
with program management. (The terms sys-
tems engineering and program management
have never been clearly defined.) In these
days of vast Federal budget deficits and in-
creasing overseas competition, it is impera-
tive that we get more for each research and
development dollar.This is the only way we
will retain our leadership in high technology
and, in the long run, our way oflife.
One of the most vexing aspects of managing
large programs within NASA (or any other
high technology government programs) is
how to allocateprogram funds in a way that
isbest forthe program. One ofthe major rea-
sons isthat the roleof cost changes through-
out the phases of the program. Another rea-
son isthat totalcostisnot allthat easy to de-
fine; yet another is that funding, which is
based on annual appropriations, is almost
never consistent with fiscallyefficientpro-
gram spending rates. The net result is that
program costs almost always escalate and
inordinate time is spent controlling costs at
the expense of maintaining performance or
schedule.
Many studies have tried to address thisprob-
lem. They show that program costs will esca-
lateby at leasta factorofthree,from approv-
al to completion. The studies suggest a num-
ber of guidelines that should be followed if
costs are to be kept down, including clear
definition of requirements, stable manage-
ment and strong central control. Unfortu-
nately, these factors are not always under
the controlofthe program manager.
The principles are simple. First,define very
carefully what it is you are trying to do.
Check everything you do against that base-
line,even ifithas to be changed, and resist
change once the decisions have been made.
Second, break up the program into manage-
ably sized deliverables that can be measured
in terms of cost, schedule and performance,
and define the interfaces between them.
Third, continuously assess the risks to suc-
cess as the program proceeds, and modify
only as necessary.
Requirements Traceability
Most studies have shown that the primary
reason for cost escalation is that not enough
time or resources are spent in defining the
program. It is clear that you cannot control
what you have not or cannot define. It is dur-
ing this period that some of the most elegant
systems engineering should be performed,
especially in understanding the cost of every
requirement and its systems implication.
Even if the definition is adequate during the
early phases of the program, it is imperative
that great vigilance be exercised in main-
taining the baseline definition of the pro-
gram and the fundamental reasons for doing
the program.
This process establishes a small but influen-
tial part of the program office, preferably
within the systems engineering organiza-
tion. The program office must be dedicated to
the traceability of requirements and to en-
suring that a clear path exists from program
rationale to program requirements to sys-
tems requirements to systems design. Too of-
ten, once a design has been established,
changes are proposed and enacted that bear
little relationship to the original premises of
the program. As will be discussed later in
this paper, there are many reasons for
change, but where possible, changes should
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